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ABSTRACT 
In this study we attempt to explain variations across the Swiss 
regional states (cantons) in public health care expenditures. The 
large autonomy of the cantons in the organization and financing 
of health care services creates strong heterogeneity. Per capita 
public expenditures in health care are assumed to depend on the 
median tax share, intergovernmental grants, and some structural 
factors. The empirical analysis shows that cantonal behavior is 
sensitive to federal subsidies. Moreover, changes in median 
income seem to have significantly larger effects on budgetary 
behavior than do equal changes in grants from the federal state, 
leading to a result which is contrary to part of the empirical  
literature on the flypaper-effect. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Swiss health care system is based on a peculiar health 
insurance system, whose characteristics are between private and 
social insurance. On the one hand, the State plays a significant 
role in terms of regulation1: health insurance is universal 
(mandatory for all residents), it covers a package of health-care 
benefits defined by law, premiums are community rating and 
subject to State regulation, and a subsidy is designed to help 
people with low income pay their health insurance premiums; on 
the other hand, health insurance is consumer-driven, since 
individuals are required to purchase their own health insurance 
by choosing one of the about 90 competing private insurance 
companies (sickness funds) that offer the basic insurance plan. 2   
In 2004 health care costs total CHF 51.7 billion in 
Switzerland and correspond to 11.6% of GDP.3 With respect to 
per-capita health expenditures Switzerland ranks first among 
European countries and second (aft er the U.S.) in the world. 
However, if compared to the majority of Western countries, the 
share of public health expenditure is particularly low. Only a 
quarter of health care financing (26.4% in 2002) is collected in 
Switzerland by means of taxes.  Moreover, this contribution is 
provided by three distinct layers of government, the federal 
government, the 26 cantons and the 2700 municipalities approx. 
The Swiss health sector is strongly marked by federalism.  
Decentralization of competences and expenditure has led to 
significant inter-cantonal differences with regard to public 
expenditure, tax rates, regulatory settings and to production 
capacity. The aim of this study is to focus on public health care 
                                                 
1 See Reinhardt (2004). 
2 See Herzlinger and Parsa-Parsi (2004). 
3 See Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2006). 
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expenditure and to analyze the determinants of per-capita public 
health expenditure variability across the Swiss cantons.4 
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we present the 
main features of public health care financing in Switzerland and 
show the impact of federalism on cantonal expenditure; in 
sections 3 and 4 we discuss the specification of the model and 
submit the empirical estimation results of the panel data set. 
Conclusions are drawn in section 5. 
 
II. FEDERALISM AND PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE 
IN SWITZERLAND  
Public expenditure accounts in Switzerland for only one 
quarter of total health care costs. The remaining three quarters 
are financed through mandatory health insurance premiums 
(26.3%), social insurance contributions (7.7%), premiums for 
private complementary insurance (9.7%), co-payment of insured 
services (5.2%) and out-of-pocket payments (23.7%).5  
The presence of such a large number of third-party payers 
makes it extremely complex to follow the financial flows in 
Switzerland. Since many services are simultaneously financed by 
multiple payers (the state and the mandatory health insurance or 
the mandatory health insurance and complementary private 
insurers) it is difficult to manage the health care expenditures in 
general, due to a cost shifting problem.6  
80% of public spending is provided by regional and local 
governments. Out of respect for the typical organization of a 
federal state, in the health and social sectors the Federal 
                                                 
4 In a previous paper  [see Crivelli et al, 2006] we analyzed the determinants of 
socialized health expenditure, by considering the mandatory health insurance 
expenditure in addition to public spending. 
5 Overall, two-thirds of the financing do not depend on the citizens’ ability to pay. 
6 Since nobody is entirely responsible for the global health care budget, it is sometimes 
easier for a single financing body (e.g. the Canton) to obtain a reduction in its own 
financial share, rather than to engage in a more rational use of total health care 
spending. This encourages shifting costs at the expense of another payer, rather than 
looking for solutions which would allow an effective rationalization of expenditure. 
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Constitution grants large decision-making autonomy and 
financial responsibility to the single cantons.7 In other words, in 
Switzerland the bodies that formally have the task of 
guaranteeing access to health services (also through financial 
support) and of monitoring the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
system are the cantonal governments, while the Confederation is  
responsible only for the regulation of health insurance.8  
Public health expenditure of local and cantonal governments 
can be subdivided in two main elements: (1) direct health 
expenditure (in 2003 this item totals CHF 8.2 billion), and (2) 
health insurance subsidies for persons with a low income (in 
2003 CHF 2.96 billion were distributed to households).9  
1) Direct public health expenditure 
As far as direct health expenditure is concerned, 92% of 
cantonal and local spending (CHF 7.58 billion in 2003) is 
devoted to assuring financial support for public- interest 
hospitals, nursing homes and institutions offering home care 
services. Figure 1 displays the per capita amount directly spent 
by each canton in 2003. 
The largest share in direct public health expenditure (on 
average 80%) concerns the hospital sector (acute and psychiatric 
hospitals), where the cantons’ autonomy is particularly 
                                                 
7 According to article 3 of the Federal Constitution “ the Cantons are sovereign insofar 
as their sovereignty is not limited by the Federal Constitution; they shall exercise all 
rights which are not transferred to the Confederation”. 
8 A change in route happened in 1996. The introduction of compulsory insurance and 
the definition of the benefit basket guaranteed to all the Swiss population has brought 
about the institutionalization of a public service on a national scale, in the sense that 
minimum health services, for which universal access is granted to all citizens, cannot 
be modified by decision of the single cantonal governments. However, the additional 
decision-making powers of the central body were not supported by a formal devolution 
of competences from the cantons to the Confederation (which would have required a 
change in the Constitution) nor by a redistribution of public health expenditures for a 
greater engagement of the Confederation [see Crivelli and Filippini, 2003]. 
9 However, only CHF 968 million were financed directly by the cantons, while CHF 
1.99 billion were provided to them by the federal government by means of a specific 
matching grant. 
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important.10 Each of the 26 cantons is bound to elaborate its own 
hospital planning, which defines the list of hospitals authorized 
to practice and be reimbursed by the compulsory health 
insurance for the citizens of the canton. The inter-cantonal 
differences with regard to acute beds density are very marked. 
The national average 2003 was 367 acute beds per 100,000 
inhabitants, but two cantons exceeded this average by 50% or 
more [Jura (JU): 527 beds and Basel-City (BS): 671 beds], 
whereas 5 cantons shown a density over 30% lower than the 
national average [Zug (ZG): 214 beds, Schwyz (SZ): 224 beds, 
Thurgovia (TG): 233 beds, Obwalden (OW): 245 beds, and 
Nidwalden (NW): 254 beds].  
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Figure 1:       Per capita direct health expenditure (2003) in the 26 Cantons
Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2005)
 
Note that these density figures have to be corrected by 
considering cross-border hospital care (i.e. patients of a 
                                                 
10 For more detailed information about the nursing home sector see Crivelli et al 
(2002). 
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particular canton who are treated in another canton), in order to 
arrive at the real situation.11  
How hospital services have to be financed is defined in the 
federal legislation. The tariffs paid for the canton’s inhabitants 
by the mandatory health insurance in public- interest hospitals 
must cover “maximum 50 per cent of the costs that can be 
invoiced in the general ward”. The other half of the operating 
costs (those not covered by the health insurers), as well as 
investment, training and research costs have to be financed by 
the Canton by means of tax revenues.12  
If for medical reasons an insured person resorts to the 
services of a public- interest hospital situated outside his/her 
canton of residence, the canton of residence has to assume the 
difference between the costs invoiced and those corresponding to 
the tariffs applicable to the inhabitants of the canton where the 
aforesaid hospital is situated. 
Conversely, private hospital services are financed exclusively 
by the health insurers (basic insurance and complementary 
private insurances). Therefore, according to present legislation 
the public-private mix in the hospital supply has a strong impact 
on public health expenditure. The higher the percentage of 
people getting hospital care in a private clinic in a canton, the 
higher the share entirely covered by means of health insurance 
premiums, relaxing the public health budget. 
2) Health insurance premiums subsidies 
To reduce the social impact of per capita payments, the 
Health Insurance Act of 1996 introduced State subsidies for 
persons with a low income.  The financing of these subsidies is 
                                                 
11 In Switzerland cross-border care is very important from both the demand and the 
supply side. Cross-border patients represent a significant share of hospital demand in 
some cantons, whereas in other cantons an important share of bed capacity serves to 
provide hospital care to patients living outside the cantonal boundaries. For details see 
Crivelli (1998). 
12 Public hospital services reimbursed by the compulsory insurance are therefore 
financed in a dual mode: partly by the health insurers and partly by the State. 
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ensured to the extent of two-thirds by the Confederation and one 
third by the cantons, through general taxation. The 
Confederation’s funds are distributed as a specific matching 
grant.13 The financial participation of each canton is established 
on the base of an equa lizing allocation system, in consideration 
of its financial strength (the marginal cantonal price for one CHF 
of distributed subsidy varies 2003 between 8 and 64 cents).14 
Moreover, the cantons have the authority not to use all the 
federal grant.15 Finally, the task of implementing the subsidy 
distribution system lies solely with the single cantons.  
The per capita spending on health insurance subsidies in the 
different cantons is illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Per capita subsidy to health insurance 
premiums (2003)
Source:  Swiss Federal Office of Public Health (2005)
 
                                                 
13 A complete discussion of the different grant types is provided by Bailey (1999). 
Note that from 2008 the specific matching grant should be replaced by a lump -sum 
general grant. In the future the budget of the Confederation for the program of 
premium reductions will total “25 percent of the compulsory health insurance 
expenditure for 30 percent of the population” and will be allocated to the cantons 
without regard to their own contribution. 
14 See Dafflon (2004) for more details. 
15 The maximum reduction totals 50% of the allocated funds. 
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The 26 cantonal systems of subsidies differ greatly one from 
the other, in terms of technical profile as well as effectiveness. 
The threshold for obtaining subsidies for the mandatory health 
insurance, e.g. in the case of a married couple with two children, 
varies from 20,000 PPP-$ of taxable income in Canton Ticino 
(TI) to 54,000 PPP-$ in Basel-Country (BL). As a result, the 
burden of the compulsory health insurance premium for a given 
kind of household varies greatly depending on the canton of 
residence.16  
This short descriptive analysis of public health expenditure in 
Switzerland sheds light on the fact that the federal structure has 
created marked differences between local government 
expenditures, whose level can also be influenced by the 
intergovernmental matching grant that the Central State 
introduced in 1996 with the aim of increasing the vertical equity 
of the community rating premiums.  
III. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATES  
In this study we use a simplest median voter model as a 
starting point.17 Under this model the demand for local 
government spending is a function of the median voter income 
and median tax price of spending in the jurisdiction. 18 Moreover, 
the model will take into account the fact that the central 
government annually pays a specific matching grant to the 
cantonal government to subsidize health insurance premiums. As 
we know from the literature, intergovernmental specific 
matching grants stimulate provision of local government services 
                                                 
16 To illustrate the size of variation we can quote the case of a family of four persons – 
two parents and two minor children – with a gross income of 45,000 Euro. In 2004 for 
health insurance this kind of family paid 4.7 percent of their after-tax income if 
resident in Canton Obwalden, whereas the burden rose to about 16 percent of the after-
tax income for a similar family residing in Canton Neuchâtel. 
17 Vatter and Rüefli (2003) have carried out an empirical investigation of the 
differences in the cantonal public health expenditure using a political science approach. 
18 For a review of the median voter model see Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) and 
Mueller (2003). For an application of the median voter model across levels of 
government see Turnbull and Mitias (1999). 
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by increasing the real incomes of local voters and by reducing 
the relative price of the service in question.19 Therefore, 
matching grants encourage consumption by the median voter. In 
this framework, it is assumed that the local authority behaves in 
accordance with the median voter’s preferences.  
Several studies have attempted to explain the variation across 
states and over time in public health care expenditures. In these 
studies, total expenditures are assumed to depend on the median 
voter income, the median tax share, intergovernmental grants, 
and some demographic and structural factors.20 
In the public choice literature, it is argued that the more 
citizens can express their preferences, the more public goods will 
be fashioned according to their tastes.21 Of course, in a state like 
Switzerland, based on a direct democracy system, this thesis is 
relevant. Instruments for the direct political participation of citizens 
are present both at the federal and cantonal level. However, the 
direct democratic rights at the level of cantons are very 
heterogeneous. Therefore, the variation across cantons in public 
expenditures could be also explained by different barriers which 
prevent citizens from participating in the political process. The 
empirical model that we use in this study will also consider this 
factor. 
 The difference in the political ideology across cantons could 
also explain the difference in the public health care expenditures. 
For this reason the potential influence of this factor is examined 
by including in the empirical model the share of the seats in the 
cantonal parliaments of the left-wing parties.22 We expect to find 
a positive impact of this variable on the public health care 
                                                 
19 There is a significant body of research estimating the effects of matching grants on 
local public expenditure. For a review of this literature see Ribar and Wilhelm (1999). 
20 See Gouveia (1996), Oulasvirta (1999) and Levaggi and Zanola (2003). 
21 For a discussion of this issue see Oates (1972 and 1999), Leu (1986), Frey (1994). 
22 The seats of the following parties are considered in the creation of the LEFT-
variable: SP, EVP, CSP, PDA, AGF, Grüne. We used this variable because the Swiss 
cantonal political institutions (parliaments and governments) are based on a system of 
proportional representation. 
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expenditures, since these parties have been traditionally in favour 
of a state intervention in this sector. 
Following the previous studies and taking into account the 
availability and quality of data for the Swiss cantons, we decided 
to specify the following parsimonious cantonal public health 
expenditures model using a log- log functional form:  
PHEit = f (Yit, Pit, MCSit,MGit, DDIit, LEFTit,T)   (1) 
where subscript i stands for the canton, t for the year, and:   
PHEit =  public health expenditures per capita;  
Yit =  median income 23;  
Pit =  median tax share24;  
MCSit =  marginal state share, calculated as 1 minus the federal 
matching rate for health insurance subsidies;  
MGit =  matching grant received by the cantonal government;  
DDIit =  cantonal index for direct democracy. Direct 
democracy is defined in terms of individual political 
participation possibilities. The index was calculated 
                                                 
23  Unfortunately, no precise information is available in order to estimate the 
median voter income in each canton and year. For this reason we decided to 
approximate the median voter income by a “pseudo” average income. For the 
computation of this variable we relied on the federal income tax statistics.  
This “pseudo” average income should approximate, at least in a crude way, 
the median income for two reasons. First, we divided the total gross revenue 
of the households with nonzero taxable income (80% of the total) by the total 
number of households. Second, the federal income tax statistics considered 
also the foreign households that do not have the right to vote. Because the 
majority of the foreign households belong to the middle and low income 
classes, the median income computed with this tax statistics would be lower 
than the median income of the households with the right to vote. With our 
approach we obtain a “pseudo” average value that is lower than the “true” 
average income but higher than the median. For a discussion of this issue see 
e.g. Pommerehne (1978). 
24 As a reference household for the computation of the median tax share we 
took a family with two children. This type of household can be considered 
representative of the Swiss families.  
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by Trechsel and Serdült (1999) and Frey and Stutzer 
(2000);25 
LEFTit = the share of the seats in the cantonal parliaments of the 
left-wing parties; 
T =  time variable which should capture the cost 
differences over time owing to changes in medical 
technology or to other factors that may influence the 
development of health costs at the national level. 
IV.  DATA AND ESTIMATION RESULTS  
The econometric estimation of model [1] is based on a 
combination of time-series and cross-section data for 26 cantons 
over the period 1996-2002.26 These data were obtained from 
some annual publications by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 
the Swiss Federal Department of Finance and the Swiss Federal 
Office of Public Health. Note that for the index of direct 
democracy only one value is available for the whole period 
analyzed. Therefore, model [1] includes one time- invariant 
variable. 27 
For the share of the seats in the cantonal parliaments of the 
left-wing parties we considered the elections in 1999 and in 
2003. Equation [1] is estimated by applying a log- log functional 
form. With regard to the choice of econometric technique, it 
should be noted that in the econometric literature we can find 
various types of models focusing on cross-sectional variation, i.e. 
heterogeneity across units. The three most widely used 
                                                 
25 The direct democracy index is indicated by the public choice theory as a means for 
individuals to express their preferences over public issues, especially in a decentralized 
context. The index varies from 1 to 6. A value close to six signifies that citizens in that 
particular canton manage to express their preferences over public issues to a greater 
extent. 
26 It is worth pointing out that some variables of the model show a high within 
variation while others show a low within variation. 
27 In a preliminary version of the model we included as explanatory variables a dummy 
for cantons with a university hospital, the ratio between import and export of hospital 
patients and the share of public interest hospitals. However, these variables turned out 
to be statistically not significant and were left out of the final model specification. 
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approaches are: the fixed-effects model, the random effects 
model and the Kmenta approach. 28   
In order to choose between the fixed-effects model and the 
random-effects model we applied the Hausman test. This test 
checks the null hypothesis that the explanatory variables and the 
individual-specific error terms are uncorrelated. The result of the 
test shows that the differences in coefficients between the two 
models are not systematic, thus implying that the random effects 
model is to be preferred. Moreover, the within variation of the 
majority of the variables included in the model is relatively low 
and this could imply a low statistical efficiency of the fixed 
effects model. Therefore, the following comments are based on 
the results obtained with the GLS model.  
Further, the matching grant may be endogenous because 
cantons simultaneously select the amount of the health 
expenditures and the amount of the potential grant that they want 
to use. In order to cope with this endogeneity problem we follow 
two strategies. First, we used a lag of the grant as proxy for the 
actual value in equation [1]. Second we used instrumental-
variable methods.29   
Table 1 presents the final regression results. Most of the 
coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero and 
carry the expected sign. The log-log transformation permits us to 
consider the estimated coefficients as elasticities.  
 
                                                 
28 For a detailed presentation of the econometric methods that have been used to 
analyze panel data, see Greene (2003) and Baltagi (1995). The Kmenta approach is 
also technically known as the  cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and timewise 
autoregressive model (Kmenta, 1986). This approach is attractive when N, the number 
of units, is lower than T, the number of periods, or when the within variation of many 
explanatory variables is very low.  
29 The instrumental variables  include  some cantonal socio-economic variables (such 
as aggregate cantonal income per capita, Gini coefficient, rate of unemployment, 
physician density, proportion of elderly people), and a binary indicator that equals 1 if 
the canton is located in the Italian or French speaking part of Switzerland. For this 
approach we used a two-stage least squares random-effects estimator due to Balestra 
and Varadharajan-Krishnakumar. 
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Table 1  Econometric results  
Coefficients IV model 
 
Random 
effects-model  
 
b0 -0.102 
(1.466) 
1.075 
(1.674) 
bY 0.483*** 
(0.127) 
0.472*** 
(0.144) 
bP -0.067** 
(0.032) 
-0.037 
(0.036) 
bMG 0.371*** 
(0.047) 
0.180*** 
(0.052) 
bMCS 0.020 
(0.057) 
-0.098 
(0.060) 
bdi -0.280** 
(0.137) 
-0.390** 
(0.140) 
bleft 
 
0.041** 
(0.013) 
0.031** 
(0.015) 
bT 
 
0.018*** 
(0.004) 
0.030*** 
(0.005) 
*, **, ***: significantly different from zero at the 90, 
 95 and 99% confidence level. 
 
  
The estimation points out that the median income and grant 
elasticities are, as expected, positives and significantly different 
from zero. Moreover, the value of the median income elasticity is 
higher than the grant elasticity. The level of the median income 
seems to stimulate more spending than the specific matching 
grant. This result is contrary to part of the empirical  literature on 
the flypaper-effect.30 
As expected, the price elasticity of the median tax share is, at 
least in the IV model, negative and significantly different from 
zero. On the other hand, the marginal state share is not 
statistically significant. 
The negative sign of the coefficient of DDI could imply that, 
in those cantons where direct democracy is stronger, health care 
                                                 
30 For a discussion on this issue see Bailey and Connolly (1998) and Levaggi and 
Zanola (2003). 
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expenditures are generally lower because citizens’ preferences 
are taken more seriously, and waste contained.31  
The coefficient of the share of the seats in the cantonal 
parliaments of the left-wing parties is positive and significantly 
different from zero at the 95% confidence level. This result 
confirms the hypothesis that left parties tend to support a higher 
state intervention in the health care sector.  
Time variable T is positive and significantly different from 
zero. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Our study has presented the structure of regional public 
health care expenditure in Switzerland and an empirical analysis 
of its determinants. The descriptive analysis shows that in 
Switzerland, where the principle of federalism is very deep-
rooted and deeply felt by the whole population, the 
decentralization of the health care sector has given rise to 
significant differences between cantons in terms of per-capita 
public health expenditures. 
In the second part of the paper we have presented the results 
of the estimation of a double logarithmic linear econometric 
model of per-capita regional public health expenditures over the 
years 1996-2003 using panel data. The model serves to 
determine the responsiveness of per-capita public expenditures to 
the median voter income, median tax share, the price and size of 
the intergovernmental matching grant, the strength of direct 
democracy and the share of the left-wings parties in the cantonal 
parliaments. The empirical analysis shows that cantonal behavior 
is sensitive to the federal subsidies. Moreover, changes in median 
                                                 
31 It is interesting to bring to the fore the fact that in Switzerland popular initiatives and 
referenda are a central part of the democratic life of the country, and they are very 
frequently used. Citizens can also call a referendum on issues like cantonal hospital 
planning.  
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income seem to have significantly larger effects on budgetary 
behavior than do equal changes in grants from the federal state.  
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